為什么不能逼蘋果解鎖（中英雙語）

青島希尼爾翻譯公司（www.marshallsfreshproduce.com）整理發(fā)布2016-03-07

希尼爾翻譯公司（www.marshallsfreshproduce.com）2016年3月07日了解到：To watch the confrontation between the US’s most valuable company and its top law enforcement agency is to find oneself in a state of nearly permanent cognitive dissonance.

觀察一下美國最有價(jià)值的公司與美國最高執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)之間的對峙，你會(huì)陷入一種近乎永久性“認(rèn)知失調(diào)”的狀態(tài)中。

Apparently, America’s government agencies are both omnipotent and helpless. Omnipotent because, as this week’s batch of surveillance revelations from WikiLeaks suggests, they have no problems intercepting highly secretive communications between their European allies. Helpless because, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s bosses keep repeating, they need Apple’s co-operation in order to break into the iPhone of the shooter in the San Bernardino attacks.

顯然，美國政府機(jī)構(gòu)既無所不能，又很無助。之所以說無所不能是因?yàn)?，正如上周維基解密(WikiLeaks)爆料的數(shù)起監(jiān)控案例所表明的那樣，它們在攔截歐洲盟友之間高度機(jī)密的通信內(nèi)容方面神通廣大。之所以說無助是因?yàn)?，正如?lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)的頭頭們屢次重申的那樣，它們需要蘋果(Apple)的合作，以解鎖圣貝納迪諾槍擊案兇手的iPhone。

It gets worse. On February 9, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, boasted in his Senate testimony that “in the future, intelligence services might use the [internet of things] for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.” Now we learn that such agencies cannot get into our smartphones … let alone our smart fridges.

更糟的還在后面。今年2月9日，美國國家情報(bào)總監(jiān)(DNI)詹姆斯克拉珀(James Clapper)在參議院作證時(shí)夸耀稱，“未來，情報(bào)部門可能使用（物聯(lián)網(wǎng)）來確認(rèn)、監(jiān)聽、監(jiān)控、定位以及定向招募，或者進(jìn)入網(wǎng)絡(luò)或者用戶憑據(jù)”。現(xiàn)在我們知道，這些機(jī)構(gòu)無法進(jìn)入我們的智能手機(jī)……更別說我們的智能冰箱了。

Something in the government’s rhetoric does not add up. The FBI either has solid reasons to break into that phone — in which case it is not obvious why the mighty power of the National Security Agency and other government bodies has not yet been mobilised — or it is simply using the San Bernardino case as an excuse to redefine its relationship with Silicon Valley.

美國政府的某些言論并不能自圓其說。FBI要么有解鎖那部手機(jī)的充足理由——如果是這種情況的話，美國國家安全局(NSA)和其他政府機(jī)構(gòu)的強(qiáng)大能力不知為何沒有被動(dòng)用——要么只是以圣貝納迪諾槍擊案為借口來重新界定它與硅谷的關(guān)系。

Asked by a judge about its willingness to enlist the help of all the federal agencies in a similar case from 2015, the government responded that “federal prosecutors don’t have an obligation to consult the intelligence community in order to investigate crime.”

在2015年的一起類似案件中，當(dāng)被一名法官問及是否愿意爭取所有聯(lián)邦機(jī)構(gòu)的幫助時(shí)，美國政府回應(yīng)稱，“聯(lián)邦檢察機(jī)關(guān)沒有咨詢情報(bào)部門以調(diào)查犯罪行為的義務(wù)”。

And since very little is known about the true capabilities of America’s intelligence community, everyone involved in the current debate has to pretend that the world’s most powerful spying agency does not exist.

既然人們對美國情報(bào)機(jī)關(guān)的真實(shí)能力知之甚少，所有卷入當(dāng)前辯論的人不得不假裝，這個(gè)全球最強(qiáng)大的情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)并不存在。

While the FBI’s defence has been that their request is extremely narrow — once Apple has facilitated access to that single phone, it is free to destroy the code required to do so — the broader political context in which this battle unfolds suggests that Apple’s stance will have far-reaching implications.

盡管FBI一直辯稱，他們的要求極低——一旦蘋果幫助解鎖了那部手機(jī)，就可以銷毀為此開發(fā)的代碼——但這場爭斗所處的更廣泛的政治環(huán)境表明，蘋果的立場將具有深遠(yuǎn)的影響。

First, the FBI’s request comes at a time when the US government is exerting immense pressure on America’s largest technology companies to join it in the fight against Isis. Both the state department and the Department of Defense have recently expanded their presence in Silicon Valley.

首先，F(xiàn)BI提出請求之際，正值美國政府對美國大型科技公司施加巨大壓力，要求它們加入到打擊“伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)中。FBI和美國國防部最近都擴(kuò)大了在硅谷的存在。

While many such requests are straightforward — removing jihadist propaganda from YouTube or Twitter, for example — there are concerns that such pressure might extend to modifying their algorithms in order to hide certain types of content from easily susceptible users.

盡管許多此類要求很直接——例如，消除YouTube或Twitter上的圣戰(zhàn)宣傳標(biāo)語——但仍有人擔(dān)心，此類壓力可能延展至要求科技公司調(diào)整算法，以便向容易受影響的用戶屏蔽某些類型的內(nèi)容。

Google knows what is in your inbox; why should it not modify your search results to make you less of a terrorist?

谷歌(Google)知道你的收件箱里有什么；它為何不應(yīng)調(diào)整你的搜索結(jié)果以便降低你發(fā)展成恐怖分子的可能性？

Second, it is hard to believe that the San Bernardino case will be an isolated episode. Not only are there several similar cases already pending in US courts but many prosecutors have already indicated they have their own backlog of phones to unlock.

其次，很難相信圣貝納迪諾槍擊案會(huì)是一個(gè)孤立事件。美國法院已有多起類似的案件等待判決，而且很多檢察官已表示，他們也有大量手機(jī)等待解鎖。

Manhattan district attorney Cyrus Vance said recently that he would “absolutely ... want access to all those phones that are crucial in a criminal investigation.”

曼哈頓地區(qū)檢察官塞勒斯萬斯(Cyrus Vance)最近表示，他“肯定……希望破解所有在刑事調(diào)查中起關(guān)鍵作用的手機(jī)?！?span id="y4mwsemgwi0" class="style52">

Even if Apple chose to destroy the code it writes to help the FBI on this occasion, it would need to rewrite it for a new request. Should it keep this code forever, it would be holding on to a magic key to its devices — a highly prized asset for any hacker.

即便蘋果選擇銷毀這次為幫助FBI而編寫的代碼，以后再有新的要求時(shí)它還得重寫。如果蘋果永遠(yuǎn)保留這個(gè)代碼，這將為其設(shè)備保有一把帶有魔力的鑰匙：這對于任何黑客而言都是一項(xiàng)十足珍貴的資產(chǎn)。

Given the publicity of the case, any terrorists would probably stop using Apple’s products anyway. The only people to suffer would be ordinary users, stuck with their iPhones and iPads.

鑒于此案的曝光度，所有恐怖主義分子恐怕都不會(huì)再用蘋果產(chǎn)品。唯一的受害者將是那些離不開iPhone和iPad的普通用戶。

Third, the FBI’s rationale in this case would make any other manufacturer of smart devices — including all those smart fridges and smart thermostats in your smart home — subject to similar requests.

第三，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局在此案中提出的理由將令所有其他生產(chǎn)智能設(shè)備的制造商（包括你的智能家居中的智能冰箱和智能恒溫器）服從類似的要求。

If Apple can be forced to modify security protocols on its phone, what stops the FBI from asking the manufacturer of the smart smoke detector to trigger a fake smoke alarm? Or asking the manufacturer of the smart car to drive suspects directly to the police station?

如果蘋果可以被迫修改其手機(jī)的安全協(xié)議，那么還有什么能阻止FBI要求智能煙霧報(bào)警器制造商發(fā)出虛假煙霧報(bào)警？或者要求生產(chǎn)智能汽車的制造商讓嫌疑人乘坐的汽車直接開到警察局？

All of this would seem neat so long as the government agencies were competent and nobody else could take advantage of such vulnerabilities.

所有這些似乎都會(huì)安然無事，只要政府機(jī)構(gòu)有能力，而且其他人無法利用這些脆弱性。

This is not so. The San Bernardino case — where the FBI had a chance to break into the phone but blew it by changing the suspect’s Apple password — suggests that the FBI’s technical competence does not yet match the NSA’s.

但情況并非如此，在圣貝納迪諾槍擊案中，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局曾經(jīng)有機(jī)會(huì)破解那部手機(jī)，但在修改嫌疑人的蘋果密碼時(shí)搞砸了。這表明，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局的技術(shù)能力還趕不上美國國家安全局。

And it would be suicidal to force technology companies to weaken security at a time when institutions of all sorts are vulnerable to hackers demanding ransoms — earlier this month, a hospital in California paid the bitcoin equivalent of $17,000 to hackers who had breached its computer network.

在各類機(jī)構(gòu)容易受到索要贖金的黑客的攻擊之際，迫使科技公司削弱產(chǎn)品的安全性無異于自殺。本月早些時(shí)候，加州一家醫(yī)院向攻擊其電腦網(wǎng)絡(luò)的黑客支付了價(jià)值相當(dāng)于1.7萬美元的比特幣。

Apple’s proposed solution is the right one: America needs a comprehensive political debate on the issue — one that would bypass inter-agency squabbling.

蘋果提出的解決方案是正確的：美國需要就這個(gè)問題展開一場全面的政治辯論，這場辯論將繞開機(jī)構(gòu)之間的爭吵。

Alas, given how little the current batch of presidential candidates seems to care, or even understand, these issues, this debate is not likely to happen.

唉，當(dāng)前的各位總統(tǒng)候選人似乎都不太關(guān)心這些問題，甚至不太了解，因此這場辯論不太可能出現(xiàn)。