（雙語(yǔ)新聞） 全球金融危機(jī)續(xù)集即將上演

青島希尼爾翻譯公司（www.marshallsfreshproduce.com）整理發(fā)布2017-08-04

希尼爾翻譯公司（www.marshallsfreshproduce.com）2017年8月4日了解到：The financial scene is familiar, the stuff of films like Inside Job and The Big Short. Rocket-scientist financiers buy up billions of dollars of risky loans and repackage them into complex investments with multiple layers of debt. Credit rating agencies classify the top layers as triple A. Institutional investors, including pension funds and charitable organisations, flock to buy these apparently risk-free yet high-yielding investments. Tension builds.

這幅金融景象非常熟悉，都是《監(jiān)守自盜》(Inside Job) 和《大空頭》(The Big Short，見(jiàn)上圖)等電影中的場(chǎng)景。金融能手們購(gòu)買了數(shù)十億美元的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款，并將它們重新打包為帶有多層次債務(wù)的復(fù)雜投資產(chǎn)品。信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)將最高層債務(wù)評(píng)為AAA。包括養(yǎng)老基金和慈善組織在內(nèi)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者競(jìng)相購(gòu)買這些貌似無(wú)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)但高收益的投資產(chǎn)品。緊張不斷加劇。
But the year is not 2006 or 2007. It is today. While the US administration talks of repealing Dodd-Frank, the reality is that regulators have been flouting that law for years and now the shadow financial markets are frothing. Almost a decade after the global financial crisis, the sequel has arrived.
但這不是2006年或者2007年的情景，而是現(xiàn)在。盡管美國(guó)政府談?wù)搹U除《多德-弗蘭克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)，但現(xiàn)實(shí)情況是，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)多年來(lái)一直無(wú)視這部法律，現(xiàn)在影子金融市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)了泡沫。在全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)近十年后，續(xù)集來(lái)了。
The central culprit this time is the collateralised loan obligation. Like its earlier esoteric cousins, a CLO bundles risky low-grade loans into attractive packages and high credit ratings. In May, there were two deals of more than $1bn each, and experts estimate that $75bn worth are coming this year. Antares Capital recently closed a $2.1bn CLO, the largest in the US since 2006 and the third-largest in history. Although most of the loans underlying these deals are of “junk” status, more than half the new debt is rated triple A. Sound familiar?
這次的罪魁禍?zhǔn)资恰百J款抵押債券”（collateralised loan obligation，簡(jiǎn)稱CLO）。與早先晦澀難懂的產(chǎn)品一樣，CLO是將高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的低評(píng)級(jí)貸款打包為具有吸引力和高評(píng)級(jí)的投資產(chǎn)品。今年5月有兩筆CLO發(fā)行，每筆都超過(guò)10億美元，專家們估計(jì)今年還會(huì)有價(jià)值750億美元的CLO發(fā)行。Antares Capital最近完成了一筆21億美元的CLO發(fā)行，這是美國(guó)自2006年以來(lái)規(guī)模最大、歷史上第三大的CLO交易。盡管這些協(xié)議中的大多數(shù)貸款是“垃圾”級(jí)別，但逾半數(shù)新債券是AAA評(píng)級(jí)。聽(tīng)起來(lái)很熟悉是吧？
During the early 2000s, similar highly rated deals called collateralised debt obligations were popular. At first, they seemed harmless, or at least not so big that their collapse could cause financial contagion. But when regulators ignored their growth, they became more opaque and more profitable, with credit ratings disconnected from reality. Like cracks in a building’s foundation, the risks seemed minor at first. But high ratings hid the instability of the entire structure. Until it was too late.
在本世紀(jì)初，名為“債務(wù)抵押債券”（collateralised debt obligation，簡(jiǎn)稱CBO）的類似高評(píng)級(jí)產(chǎn)品非常流行。最初，它們似乎沒(méi)啥危害，或者至少危害沒(méi)有大到它們的崩盤可能蔓延至整個(gè)金融行業(yè)的程度。但是在監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)忽視其增長(zhǎng)的時(shí)候，它們?cè)絹?lái)越不透明，而且利潤(rùn)越來(lái)越高，信用評(píng)級(jí)與現(xiàn)實(shí)脫節(jié)。與房屋地基出現(xiàn)裂縫一樣，這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最初似乎很小。但高評(píng)級(jí)掩蓋了整個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)的不穩(wěn)定性。直到最后為時(shí)已晚。
Dodd-Frank was supposed to stop these credit-rating ploys. But the Securities and Exchange Commission has permitted the agencies to dodge that law. While Dodd-Frank imposed liability on the agencies for false ratings, the SEC exempted them. Likewise, Congress barred the agencies from getting inside information about issuers they rate, but the SEC permitted that, too. As CLOs grow, the cracks are spreading again.
《多德-弗蘭克法案》本有望阻止這些信用評(píng)級(jí)的花招。但美國(guó)證交會(huì)(SEC)允許這些機(jī)構(gòu)規(guī)避該法。盡管《多德-弗蘭克法案》會(huì)讓這些機(jī)構(gòu)為錯(cuò)誤評(píng)級(jí)承擔(dān)責(zé)任，但證交會(huì)免除了它們的責(zé)任。同樣，國(guó)會(huì)禁止這些機(jī)構(gòu)獲取有關(guān)它們所評(píng)級(jí)的發(fā)行人的內(nèi)部信息，但證交會(huì)同樣允許這么做。隨著CLO的發(fā)展，裂縫再次擴(kuò)散。
Last Christmas Eve, the so-called risk-retention rule of Dodd-Frank took effect, requiring that arrangers of these complex deals keep a slice of the downside. But clever financiers arranged for third parties to take on this risk.
在去年圣誕節(jié)前夕，《多德-弗蘭克法案》的所謂風(fēng)險(xiǎn)自留規(guī)則生效，要求這些復(fù)雜協(xié)議的組織者承擔(dān)一部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但聰明的金融家安排第三方來(lái)承擔(dān)這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
The credit rating agencies, particularly Moody’s Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings, are the central actors in this story, just as in the original. The computer programs they use to assign triple-A ratings remain flawed. Because loan defaults can come in waves, mathematical models should account for “correlation risk”, the chance that defaults might occur simultaneously. But the models for CLOs assume correlations are low. When defaults occur at the same time, these supposed triple-A investments will be wiped out. CLOs are just CDOs in new wrapping.
信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)，尤其是穆迪投資者服務(wù)公司(Moody's Investors Service)和標(biāo)普全球評(píng)級(jí)(S&P Global Ratings)，是這種故事的主角，就像原版金融危機(jī)一樣。它們用來(lái)評(píng)定AAA評(píng)級(jí)的計(jì)算機(jī)程序依然存在缺陷。因?yàn)橘J款違約可能蜂擁而來(lái)，數(shù)學(xué)模型應(yīng)該考慮“關(guān)聯(lián)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”，即違約同時(shí)爆發(fā)的可能性。但CLO的模型假定關(guān)聯(lián)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很低。當(dāng)違約同時(shí)出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候，這些所謂的AAA投資產(chǎn)品將會(huì)血本無(wú)歸。CLO只是換了包裝的CDO。
Some experts say this time it is different. Earlier this month, Ashish Shah, a managing director of Madison Capital Funding, a subsidiary of New York Life, told a roundtable of CLO experts they should not worry about defaults in 2017. “The appetite for assets is ferocious,” he said. Pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are demanding both safety and high returns. CLOs seem to offer both.
一些專家說(shuō)，這次有所不同。7月早些時(shí)候，隸屬紐約人壽保險(xiǎn)(New York Life)旗下的麥迪遜資本融資(Madison Capital Funding)的董事總經(jīng)理阿希什?沙阿(Ashish Shah)告訴一眾CLO專家們，他們?cè)?017年不必?fù)?dān)心違約問(wèn)題。他說(shuō)：“人們對(duì)資產(chǎn)的渴望非常強(qiáng)烈?！别B(yǎng)老基金、保險(xiǎn)公司和大學(xué)捐贈(zèng)基金會(huì)既要求安全性，又要求高回報(bào)。CLO似乎滿足這兩個(gè)要求。
A new Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC is supposed to provide a check on this appetite. But when I sent a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking to identify which credit rating agencies have been found to violate SEC rules, the regulators refused to divulge names. Violators remain anonymous.
美國(guó)證交會(huì)內(nèi)部新設(shè)立的一個(gè)信用評(píng)級(jí)辦公室本應(yīng)為這種渴望把關(guān)。但是當(dāng)我依據(jù)《信息自由法》(Freedom of Information Act)發(fā)出詢問(wèn)函，尋求確認(rèn)哪些信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)被發(fā)現(xiàn)違反了證交會(huì)法規(guī)的時(shí)候，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)拒絕透露名字。違規(guī)者依然沒(méi)有被公諸于眾。
全球金融危機(jī)續(xù)集即將上演.jpg

It is hard to police the financial markets. New business school graduates are inevitably one step ahead of their regulator counterparts, and many of the least creditworthy businesses find it easy to borrow, because their loans can be quickly repackaged and sold. During the debates about Dodd-Frank repeal, legislators should keep their eyes on these complex investments and the agencies that facilitate them.

金融市場(chǎng)很難管。商學(xué)院的新畢業(yè)生必然比監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的新人領(lǐng)先一步，許多最沒(méi)有信譽(yù)的企業(yè)之所以發(fā)現(xiàn)很容易借到錢，是因?yàn)樗鼈兊馁J款可以被迅速重新打包賣出。在圍繞《多德-弗蘭克法案》廢除與否的辯論中，立法者應(yīng)該密切關(guān)注這些復(fù)雜的投資產(chǎn)品，以及助長(zhǎng)這些投資產(chǎn)品的機(jī)構(gòu)們。
Some might claim CLOs are different or smaller, or that regulators are better prepared today, or that business loans could not possibly default all at once, as home mortgage loans did. But similar arguments were made about risks during the early 2000s, before they spread to the major banks and AIG, and the markets spiralled out of control.
一些人可能宣稱，CLO有所不同，或者規(guī)模較小，或者監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)如今準(zhǔn)備更為充分，或者企業(yè)貸款不可能像住房抵押貸款那樣同時(shí)違約。但在本世紀(jì)初，在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延至大銀行和美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)(AIG)、市場(chǎng)逐漸失控之前也存在類似的觀點(diǎn)。
To avoid an even bigger crisis, regulators should heed warnings about financial dysfunction and hidden risks now, before the cracks spread.
為了避免一場(chǎng)更大危機(jī)的到來(lái)，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該在裂縫擴(kuò)散前注意金融市場(chǎng)失靈和隱藏風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的跡象。

來(lái)源:可可英語(yǔ)